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Mao Tse-tung's Revolution Continues? 
HEWITI D . .ADAMS 
Cl.emson University 
From about the first of February some symptoms have pointed to 
a possible resurgence of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 
1966-1968. Ther e was a reappearance of the wall posters, often vague 
criticism of "persons in authority," specific criticism of the late Lin Piao 
and of Confucius. These signs, coupled with the obviously approaching 
problem of succession, made it appear that a new uph eaval in China 
was imminent. 
The criticism of Lin Piao as a traitor was tied in with his alleged 
adherence to Confucian ideas. Confucius was attacked on ideological 
grounds. He was accused of promulgating "feudal" ideas of class struc-
ture. His "doctine of the mean" came in for special attack. 1 The Legatist 
school was also attacked for its "feudal" emphasis; but Confucianism 
was the chief target, pictured as the very denial of revolutionary activity . 
Revolution has so dominated our thinking about China in this cen-
tury that we find it difficult to separate the two. Scholars have identifi ed 
the Chinese Revolution as lasting for fifty or a hundred years,2 while 
Mao Tse-tung himself looked upon the maint enance of perpetual revolu-
tionary favor as necessary to the achievement of the regeneration of 
China.a Mao was especially concerned with the continuation of the rev-
olution after the old lead ership passed on. He also had the problem of 
opposition in the Party to his policies and of a lack of discipline. 
"All this is extremely harmful to the interests of the revolution. 
Party committees at every level must discuss this matter again and 
again and work earnestly to overcome such indiscipline anl anarchy 
so that all the powers that can and must be centralized will be con-
centrated in the hands of the central committee and its agencies." 4 
The revolution then, in the view of Mao in 1966, had not ended, 
but it was necessary both to intensify "redness" and to reestablish a unity 
1 Peking Review, February 1, 1974 through August 30, 1974 are examples. 
2 Wolfgang Franke, A Century of Chinese Revolution, 1851-1949; Basil Black-
well (tr), Harper and Row, New York, 1971. 
Rankir Vohra, The Chinese Revolution, 1900-1950; Houghton Mil:Bin Co., 
Boston, 1974. 
3 Andre Malraux, Anti-Memoirs, Ter ence Kilmartin. (tr), Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston; 1968, pp. 366-368. 
4 Peking Review, 30 June 1967. 
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of revolutionary goals for China. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
tion was the result. The Red Guards not only became imbued with Mao's 
revolutionary fervor, but also carried the message to their elders. Mao's 
opponents were purged from their positions of responsibility in the Party 
and in the government. To stamp out reactionary elements required posi-
tive action. "Everything reactionary is the same; if you don't hit it, it 
won't fall. This is also like sweeping the floor; as a rule, where the broom 
does not reach, the dust will not vanish of itself." 11 Mao gave the objec-
tives of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as "consolidating the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and 
building socialism." 6 
Success in the removal of reactionary elements and in the revival of 
revolutionary spirit brought an end to the Cultural Revolution in 1968. 
There was to be no end to the need for revolutionary spirit, however. In 
his report to the inth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 
1969, Lin Piao said "all revolutionary comrades must be clearly aware 
that class struggle will by no means cease in the ideological and political 
spheres. The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie by no 
means dies out with our seizure of power." 7 
Lin Piao was identified in the new constitution of the Chinese Com-
munist Party as Mao Tse-tung's "close comrade-in-arms and successor." 8 
His leadership of the Peoples' Liberation Army was dedicated to the 
continuation of the revolution. Ironically, Lin in his turn was to become 
the focus of vituperation in the big character posters of 1974. 
In 1969, in the proposed Constitution of the Chinese Communist 
Party, the socialist society was characterized as an historical phase of 
considerable duration. It was pointed out that 
"In this historical phase, classes, class contradictions and class 
struggle will exist throughout, as will the struggle between the two 
roads of socialism and capitalism, the danger of capitalist restora-
tion, and the threat of subversion and aggression by imperialism and 
modern revisionism. These contradictions can be resolved only by 
relying on the Marxist theory and practice of uninterrupted 
revolution." 9 
It seems clear that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 
did not view the end of the struggle with the forces of Chiang Kai-shek 
11 Mao Tse-tung Selected Works (hereafter S. W.); Foreign Languages Press, 
Peking, 1961, V. IV1 p. 19. 
6 Quoted in PeKing Review, January 18, 1974. 
7 New York Times, April 29, 1969, p. 12. 
s Ibid., January 8, 1969, p. 6. 
o Ibid. 
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in 1949 nor the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1968 
as the end of the revolution: in China. Revolution was to remain a con-
tinuous process under the guidance of the party until the reaching of 
the ultimate objective, "the realization of Communism." 10 
Mao's conception of what constitutes revolution may be somehow 
different from our own. As Professor Wu Tien-wei has so cogently 
pointed out, Mao Tse-tung has come under little direct Western in-
fluence. "Save for Marxism-Leninism, Mao's utopianism and nationalism 
are of Chinese origin." 11 Mao's romantic revolutionary spirit was no 
doubt influenced by such traditional Chinese stories as contained in the 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms. But does Mao's espousal of perpetual 
revolution imply that open struggle will occur again and again? Will we 
see repetitious of the Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution or will 
struggle be a matter accomplished within a framework of orderly activity 
directed toward the Party's ultimate goal? As a matter of practice, the 
revolution looks to be little different than measures taken by any govern-
ment struggling to bring "modernization." Indeed, Mao's revolutionary 
genius lies largely in his pragmatic exploitation of the opportunity offered 
by the delays in achieving "modernization" in China. As Stuart Schram 
points out, "these events [ the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution] are 
a logical culmination of Mao's life. A central theme ... has been Mao's 
participation, over half a century, in the effort of ,the Chinese to modern-
ize and develop their country, and at the same time to remain them-
selves." 12 
The struggle, under communist leadership, for "modernization" in 
China has resulted in modest rates of economic growth over the past 
15 years-perhaps 7 or 8 percent a year. There have been extensive 
changes in social structure and social institutions, some achieved by 
ruthless methods. There has been mass equalization of income and of 
perogative. These changes could be considered revolutionary in nature; 
changes such as the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution would meet our popular conceptions of "rev-
olution." 13 
10 Ibid. 
11 Tien-wei Wu, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought in Chinese and Marxian Tradition," 
a paper delivered before the southeastern Regional Conference of the Association 
for Asian Studies at Rock Hill, S. C. January 29 and 30, 1971. 
12 Stuart Schram, Moo Tse-tung, Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1967, p. 343. 
13 "A complete or drastic change of any kind." 
"Overthrow of a government, form of gove=ent, or social system, with 
another taking its place." 
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (2d ed), The World Publishing 
Company, Cleveland, 1965, V: II, p. 1553. 
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Revolution is not so evident in much that has happened and is 
happening since the Cultural Revolution. In spite of Mao's opposition 
to "the theory of 'many centers,' that is ,the theory of 'no center,' mountain 
stronghold mentality, sectarianism and all other reactionary bourgeois 
trends which undermine working class leadership ," 14 there has been a 
move toward decentralization in many areas of Chinese a.ff airs. Greater 
responsibilities in finance, farming, small industry, education and social 
services have been given to regional and local institutions-provincial 
governments and communes. If this trend were to continue, it would be 
in the Chinese tradition of regionalism and localism-hardly revolution-
ary. There is a school of thought which asserts that China since the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been run by regional Inilitary 
commanders. 15 
That decentralization will probably continue is a result of develop-
ment. As the economy becomes more pluralistic and decentralized, close 
central control becomes more difficult. There seems to be a continuing 
tendency for both the peasant and the urban dweller to "go into business 
for himself." At the grassroots, Mao has not succeeded in creating the 
"new communist man." Among both governmental and party bureau-
cracies, the growth of elitism ( which was one target of the Cultural 
Reveloution) is a constant danger. The recent reshufE!ing of military 
leaders among the provinces seems to have been an effort to prev ent 
the establishment of too-strong power bases. 
This trend toward regionalism or decentralization should not be 
over-stressed, however. The docb.ines and methods of party discipline 
( i.e. the cheng-feng movement) and the Stalinist model of industrializa-
tion have resulted in a notable conformity, at least on the surface, among 
the people and an effective central control of key parts of the economy. 
An objective of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the 
increase in industrial and agricultura l production through intensification 
of "redness." The term "Cultural Revolution" was no new one. In a 
speech by Lin Feng in June, 1960,16 the term was used in connection 
with promotion of the "walking with two legs" slogan. As used by Lin, 
the term "Cultura l Revolution" involved the use of educational work to 
meet the needs of economic construction-to the stepping up of 
production. 
The idea of reform of education in order to increase production 
was carried forward into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The 
14 Hsinhua News Agency, August 11, 1968. 
10 Jurgen Domes, The Internal Politics of China, 1949-1972, Rudiger Machetzki 
(tr), Praeger, New York, 1973, is an example. 
16 Stewart Fraser ( ed.), Chinese Communist Education, John Wiley and Sons, 
New York, 1965, pp. 376-385. 
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intensity of the struggle through which education passed and the out-
come are well recounted by William Hinton 17 and Peter Seybolt.18 
An essential element in the question of education is "for whom" 
are the opportunities to be made available. Mao felt that the person 
best qualified to combine theory and practice was the person who had 
worked before acquiring theory. The worker, peasant and soldier would 
be most important. Of these, the poor peasant had first place in Mao's 
thoughts. "Without the poor peasant class ... , it would have been im-
possible to bring about the ... revolutionary condition in the country-
side, or to overthrow the local tyrants and evil gentry and complete the 
democratic revolution." 19 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
resulted in priority in educational opportunity being given to poor 
peasants, workers, and soldiers. Origin, not intelligence or mastery of 
books, became the important qualification . 
Bureaucrats underwent a process of "going down" to work among 
peasants or industrial workers. An intimacy with the masses and their 
problems became a necessary ingredient for qualification as a party or 
governmental bureaucrat. Richard Pfeffer, in an article in the book, 
China's Developmental Experience,20 gives an excellent summary of 
bureaucratic changes since the Cultural Revolution. Rehabilitation of 
bureaucrats ( party and governmental) purged during the Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution was widespread. The highest ranking plll'ged 
official who has returned to public life is Teng Hsiano-ping, pre-Cultural 
Revolution Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. He returned to 
public life in the Fall of 1973, and in 1974 he, as Vice Premier, headed 
the Chinese delegation to the Sixth Special Session of the United 
Nations.21 Teng has substituted for the ailing Premier Chou En-lai on a 
number of public occasions recently. 
Rectification of the thinking of bureaucrats and changes in the 
educational system are being continued along lines established during 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution without a continuation of 
revolutionary activity. The cultivation of revolutionary fervor as a goad 
to production is another matter. Mao Tse-tung has said that "Revolution 
means liberating the productive forces and promoting their growth." 22 
By implication, Mao seems to tell us that only by keeping the revolu-
17 William Hinton, Hundred Days War, the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua 
University, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1972. 
18 Peter J. Seybolt , Revolutionary Education in China, Documents and Com-
mentary, International Arts and Sciences Press, White Plains, 1973. 
19 Mao Tse-tung, S. W. V.I., p. 83. 
20 Michel Oksenberg (ed.), China's Developmental Experience, Praeger, New 
York, 1973. 
21 Peking Review, April 12, 1974. 
22 Quoted in Peking Review, August 23, 1974. 
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tionary spirit burning among workers can productivity increase. In the 
absence of significant material incentives, the worker must be induced 
to greater efforts through the use of indoctrination. Fear of an external 
threa~ ( i.e. an attack by Russia) can help, but most workers will need 
an activity on which they can focus in order to be stimulated to selfless 
efforts. The criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, and the posting of the 
wall posters produced by criticism groups, seems designed to fill this 
need. 
Great claims of increas ed production are made for the spirit en-
gendered by criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius. This, then, would seem 
to be the reason for the activity noted over the spring and summer. No 
whipping up of revolutionary fervor through Red Guard activity; rath er, 
the cooperative intellectual effort of studying selected portions of the 
works of Confucius , making much of Lin Piao's expressed admiration for 
Confucius, and of the treason committed by Lin Piao, these things are 
the focus of activity. 
A report in the Peking Review of the results of such study by groups 
of industrial workers informs us: 
'1n summing up their experience in grasping revolution and pro-
moting production since the beginning of this year , workers in 
Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin deeply realize that criticism of Lin 
Piao and Confucius is a powerful motive force for developing the 
social productive forces. They pledge to continue the criticism of 
Lin Piao and Confucius and regard it as a matter of primary im-
portance so as to win still greater victories in revolution and 
production." 28 
It seems reasonable to view the criticism of Confucius and Lin Piao 
as a device to engage the worker ( agricultural and industrial) in in-
tellectual activity which will increase ( or maintain) revolutionary spirit. 
To ,the extent to which the device succeeds, there will be no need to 
unleash another Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with its excesses 
and dangers. How long can such a course continue? How long can 
criticism of Confucius and Lin Piao be meaningful in terms of its aims? 
Surely the time will come when some substitute must be produced. If 
such a time comes when the problems of succession are acute, revolution 
in a violent form could well be the result. For now, the revolution would 
seem to have reached an "Asia theory" end.24 It could flare up quickly 
and violently in response to events. 
2s Ibid. 
24 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of a Revolution, Random House, New York, 
1965, pp . 226-227. 
